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INTRODUCTION
At the heart of our antitrust jurisprudence lies the notion that
competition is good and monopolies are bad.1 A recent district
court decision in United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc. supports this
doctrine.2 The district judge prohibited a merger between the two
largest rating and review (“R&R”) companies, Bazaarvoice and
PowerReviews, because it would have given Bazaarvoice a monopoly in the industry.3 The antitrust laws and government-issued
Merger Guidelines that were relied upon in this decision aim to
prohibit anticompetitive behavior in large part to eliminate adverse
effects on society.4 This Note proposes that the R&R industry
might better serve society by allowing monopolistic behaviors rather than promoting competition.
Part I of this Note will provide background information on antitrust law, on the Bazaarvoice decision, and on the unique features
of two-sided platforms. Part II explores the efficiencies and benefits
that may justify monopolistic behavior in the R&R field, mainly
that ratings might be more accurate with fewer firms in the market.
Finally, Part III presents additional solutions to increase the accuracy and transparency of ratings. In conclusion, this Note suggests
that three of the generally acknowledged exceptions to basic antitrust principles are present in the R&R industry, and it argues that
the Bazaarvoice court could have allowed the merger.

1

See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014).
3
See id. at *76.
4
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 Merger Guidelines], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf (“Agencies normally evaluate
mergers based on their impact on customers.”).
2
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I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS USED TO ANALYZE THE R&R
INDUSTRY
Before understanding why a firm in the R&R industry may be
justified in engaging in anticompetitive behavior, it is important to
discuss the general topics on which this theory is premised. Part
I.A will set out basic antitrust principles. Part I.B will discuss characteristics of R&R providers and the Bazaarvoice decision, and
Part I.C will explain characteristics of two-sided platforms.
A. The Antitrust Framework
Antitrust laws set out to protect competition.5 They do so by
prohibiting firms from agreeing to restrain trade in some way (i.e.,
fixing prices), and by prohibiting monopolistic behaviors.6 Section
7 of the Clayton Act specifically regulates monopolies by prohibiting mergers where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”7
Typically, antitrust claims will only be fruitful if a firm has
market power,8 meaning it has the ability to profitably raise prices
above the competitive level.9 Market power is determined by the
firm’s market share.10 Before calculating the market share of a firm,
the market, which consists of both the product market and the geographical market, must be defined.11
The product market must first be decided, usually by applying
the “reasonable interchangeability” test.12 This test posits that a
5

See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
7
Id. § 18.
8
Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law,
76 GEO. L.J. 241, 242 (1987) (“Most antitrust rules require the plaintiff to show that the
defendant has or is likely to obtain ‘market power’ . . . .”).
9
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REV. 937, 937 (1981).
10
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 81–82 (3d ed. 2005).
11
See SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.
1999) (“The purpose of defining a relevant market is to assist in determining whether a
firm has market power.”).
12
See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481–82 (1992).
6
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product market should include the product in question as well as
any product that is reasonably interchangeable with the product in
question.13 The purpose of this test is to figure out what other options consumers would turn to if the provider of the relevant good
increased its prices.14 Those goods that a consumer would buy are
to be included within the market, and those goods that a consumer
would not buy are to be excluded.15
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines (discussed below) set out a
“hypothetical monopolist” test to determine which products are
considered reasonably interchangeable.16 This test asks: if a hypothetical monopolist increased the price of its service by a small but
significant amount, to what other goods would consumers turn?17
In application, the agencies most often apply a hypothetical five
percent increase in price,18 and they look to history of customer
price changes, information from customers, and any other reasonably available and reliable evidence to predict the effects of such a
price increase.19
The relevant geographic market can only be defined after the
product market is determined.20 It includes geographical areas
where a purchaser would go to buy a product or obtain services if a
firm closer to him/her raises its prices by a small but significant
amount.21 The Merger Guidelines suggest using the hypothetical
monopolist test for this as well, usually applying the hypothetical
five percent increase in prices.22

13

See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
See id.
15
See id.
16
See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.1.1 (“The Agencies use the
hypothetical monopolist test to identify a set of products that are reasonably
interchangeable with a product sold by one of the merging firms.”).
17
See id.
18
See id. § 4.1.2.
19
See id. § 4.1.3.
20
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.2
(1992, rev.1997), [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines], available at http://www.justice.
gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.
21
See, e.g., Surgical Care Ctr. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist., 309 F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 2002).
22
See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, at § 4.2.1.
14
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The ease in which a new firm can enter the market is also relevant to the discussions concerning the product and geographic
market of a good or service.23 If firms that are not yet a part of the
market are presumed to restrain trade because it is so easy for them
to enter and thereby constrain prices of incumbent firms, they
could also be included within the market.24 Defining the market
accurately is extremely important to the merger analysis because an
overly narrow definition will exaggerate anticompetitive harms
while an overly broad definition will underestimate harms.25
Usually a challenger must prove something in addition to showing that a firm has the requisite market share to win its claim.26 It
must also prove that the firm engaged in some sort of anticompetitive behavior.27 For collusion claims, this means the firm formed an
agreement with another firm that restrains trade in some way.28
For a monopoly claim, this means that the firm engaged in some
sort of exclusionary behavior.29 If, however, the monopoly challenge is to a merger, it is only necessary to show that exclusionary
activity is likely to result from the merger.30 The rest of this Note
will analyze antitrust law in the context of merger challenges.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act allows the government to monitor
merging firms, and, where acquisitions are valued in excess of
$75.9 million,31 it requires that the merger be reported.32 A merger
will usually be prohibited only where it is likely to have anticompetitive effects.33 Usually this means that the merger will result in the
firm increasing its prices, decreasing its output or quality, or harm23

See United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982 (2d Cir. 1984).
See id.
25
See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
26
Surgical Care Ctr., 309 F.3d at 839.
27
See id.
28
See Krattenmaker et al., supra note 8, at 261.
29
See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
30
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (1982).
31
See Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 3814 (Jan. 23, 2014). This figure is revised annually.
32
See Premerger Notification Program, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/
premerger-notification-program (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
33
See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.
24
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ing consumers in some other manner.34 When a merger gives the
firm monopoly power this establishes a rebuttable presumption
that the merger creates anticompetitive effects.35 This concept,
known as “unilateral effects,” is the idea that the merger enhances
market power just by eliminating competition between the merging
firms and, thus, violates antitrust law.36
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) began issuing Merger
Guidelines in 1968 in order to describe the principles and standards
the Agency used to analyze mergers.37 More recently the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) has assisted in developing these
Guidelines.38 The Guidelines do not serve as binding law; rather,
they are intended to “help the agencies identify and challenge
competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary interference with mergers that either are competitively beneficial or likely
will have no competitive impact on the marketplace.”39
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which apply to merging
firms that are horizontal competitors (as opposed to firms that are
vertically aligned in the supply chain), have been amended on multiple occasions to account for changes in the economy and the actual practices of the Agencies.40 Most recently, the Guidelines
were amended by the DOJ and FTC in 2010.41
The new guidelines emphasize that a merger analysis is ultimately about its effects on the marketplace.42 Specifically, the
guidelines suggest that the Agencies “evaluate mergers based on
34

See id.
See id. § 2.1.3.
36
See id. § 6.
37
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1968),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.htm.
38
See Press Release, FTC, Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice
Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2010/08/federal-trade-commission-and-us-department-justiceissue-revised.
39
See id.
40
See id.
41
See id.
42
See Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in
Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 56 (2010).
35
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their impact on customers.”43 In other words, mergers that will
hurt consumers are bad, while mergers that will help or have no
impact on consumers are good, or at least permissible.44
Thus, in addition to prohibiting anticompetitive behavior, antitrust laws also aim to promote positive effects in the marketplace.45
When these concepts come into tension with each other, a procompetitive justification may be able to outweigh a firm’s anticompetitive behavior.46 Examples of such justifications include behavior that creates efficiencies or other benefits to society.47
The Guidelines encourage the Agencies to examine the effects
of a merger on the direct and, when applicable, the indirect customers of the merging parties.48 Absent evidence to the contrary,
the Agencies are to assume that mergers adversely affecting direct
customers also adversely affect indirect customers.49 Problematically, the Guidelines do not provide direction on how to analyze a
merger that affects direct customers differently than indirect customers.50 This Note presents the idea that in some two-sided markets, the direct and indirect customers are affected differently and
may need to be considered differently to best serve society.
As discussed above, the prosecuting agencies use the Merger
Guidelines to determine whether or not they should take action
against a particular merger.51 While a court will consider the Guidelines favorably, it will likely employ its own burden-shifting analysis. First, it will require the government to establish that the merger
will create anticompetitive effects.52 If this is satisfied, the burden
will shift to the defending party to show that the effects are not an-

43

See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.
See id.
45
See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1979).
46
See id.
47
See id.
48
See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.
49
See id.
50
See id.
51
See Press Release, FTC, supra note 38.
52
See United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at
*64 (ND Cal. Jan. 8, 2014).
44
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ticompetitive or to discredit the government’s assertions.53 If this is
successful, the burden shifts again to the government to persuade
the court of the potential anticompetitive harms.54
B. Bazaarvoice, Power Reviews, and the Rating and Review Industry
In January 2013, the DOJ challenged the merger between ecommerce companies Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews based on the
theory that the merger would give Bazaarvoice a monopoly in the
R&R industry.55 The court found for the DOJ and prohibited the
merger.56
1. The Industry
R&R platforms are online mechanisms used by businesses to
communicate with their consumers, allowing the consumer to rate
products, leave a review, and ask questions. 57 These systems benefit product manufacturers and retailers by allowing them to communicate with customers and answer their questions,58 to syndicate
ratings among businesses,59 and to increase brand loyalty among
consumers.60 The online consumer interaction stimulates web traffic and can lead to increased sales.61
These systems also allow consumers to communicate with one
another by posting their opinions about particular products, services, restaurants, and other commodities on the Internet.62 Consumers often rely on these posts when making purchasing decisions.63
53

See id.
See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
55
See Complaint at *5–6, United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., 2014 WL 203966 (ND
Cal. Jan. 10, 2013) (No. C13-0133).
56
See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *65.
57
See id. at *5–6
58
See id. at *26.
59
See id. at *6.
60
See BAZAARVOICE: CONVERSATIONS, http://www.bazaarvoice.com/solutions/conver
sations/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
61
See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *7.
62
See Louis Camassa, Analyzing Customer Review Platforms; Amazon’s Example,
PRACTICALECOMMERCE (Apr. 5, 2002), http://www.practicalecommerce.com/
articles/3464-Analyzing-Customer-Review-Platforms-Amazon-s-Example.
63
See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *66.
54
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In fact, 70 percent of shoppers read such reviews before buying,64
and 92 percent of consumers trust recommendations from other
consumers above all forms of advertising.65 Thus, these systems
help consumers to be confident in their buying decisions.66
Because of these benefits, many businesses choose to integrate
R&R platforms onto their websites.67 In doing so, they can choose
to make their own, in-house system or they can purchase the technology from a commercial provider.68 The Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews R&R platforms provide these services and can be retained by a business to integrate R&R technology onto the company website.69
2. The Decision
At trial, the DOJ presented evidence that Bazaarvoice executives considered PowerReviews its “fiercest competitor” and was
“challenging [Bazaarvoice’s] price points.”70 Based on this and
other evidence that established the merger would eliminate Bazaarvoice’s competition, the government met its initial burden,
creating a rebuttable presumption that the merger would cause a
monopoly and anticompetitive effects.71
Bazaarvoice tried to rebut the argument by alleging that it did
not have a significant enough share of the market to have monopoly
power because there is a “broad array” of other interactive commerce options for businesses.72 The Court disagreed with this de-

64

See BAZAARVOICE: CONNECTIONS, http://www.bazaarvoice.com/solutions/ connections/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
65
See id.
66
See id.
67
See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *7.
68
See Complaint, supra note 55, at *5–6.
69
See BAZAARVOICE, http://www.bazaarvoice.com/solutions (last visited Sept. 9,
2014).
70
See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *11.
71
See id. at *65 (“As stated at the outset of the Memorandum Opinion, the
government easily established its prima facie case and Bazaarvoice was unable to rebut the
presumption of illegality.”).
72
See Pre-Trial Brief for Defendant (Redacted) at *30, Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966
(No. C13-0133).
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fense, finding that the market consisted of only R&R platforms and
no other e-commerce businesses.73
However, it is not clear that the court was right in defining the
market in such narrow terms. Bazaarvoice advertises its services as
a way for companies to stimulate interest in products and increase
sales by allowing them to communicate with their end-users.74 Bazaarvoice recognizes that its service is only one of many platforms
that businesses can turn to in order to engage with their customers.75 Alternatives include Q&A dialogues and other forums where
retailers can collect feedback.76 Companies often use social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter exclusively for these
communication features,77 and some of these sites or a combination
of sites may complement each other to some degree.78
However, even when the court defined the market narrowly to
only include R&R systems, it may have overstated Bazaarvoice’s
market share of the R&R industry. As it presented at trial, Bazaarvoice must compete with in-house R&R platforms,79 a factor to
which the court gave little weight. Many companies have implemented in-house solutions and, considering the ease with which
the platforms can be created, many more can.
Notably, Bazaarvoice had previously lost customers who
created in-house systems, and some created these solutions in a
matter of days or weeks, demonstrating how low the barriers are to
entering the field.80 Companies like Amazon have the means to
73

See id. at *66.
See BAZAARVOICE, http://www.bazaarvoice.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2014)
(emphasizing the ability customers have to respond to posts by users and showing how
increased dialogue leads to more sales).
75
See Pre-Trial Brief for Defendant, supra note 72, at *30.
76
See id.
77
See Melanie Haselmayr, Tips And Tricks To Manage Your Social Media Campaigns
Like A Pro, FORBES (MAY 16, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/
2014/05/16/tips-and-tricks-to-manage-your-social-media-campaigns-like-a-pro/.
78
See United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at
*26 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014).
79
See Post-Trial Brief for Defendant at *5, Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966 (No. C130133).
80
See id.
74
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quickly enter the market.81 In fact, Amazon testified that it considers entering the industry “almost daily.”82 These providers of
R&R could compete with Bazaarvoice and limit their ability to
create adverse effects for consumers.83 Still, the court rejected
them as viable competitors.84
C. Characteristics of Two-Sided Platforms
Because R&R platforms are two-sided, there might be other
justifications for why the merger could have been permitted. Twosided platforms (“2SPs”) are markets “with two distinct sets of
consumers, such as buyers and sellers, who wish to transact with
one another but lack efficient means of organization.”85 R&R platforms are two-sided in that they serve companies that retain R&R
services as well as the businesses’ consumers who rely on ratings
when making purchasing decisions.86
Two-sided markets create network effects.87 This is the notion
that the value of a system increases as the number of users of the
system increases.88 A prototypical example of this phenomenon is
the telephone. A single telephone owner values his telephone more
as others purchase their own phones and the first owner can call
more people.89
In two sided-markets, network effects are seen in one side of
the market when more users join the other side, and are referred to
as cross-group network effects.90 For example, in R&R platforms,
end-users who rely on ratings when making purchasing decisions
are benefitted more as the number of companies providing review
81

See id. at *7.
See id.
83
See id.
84
United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014).
85
Daniel M. Tracer, Overcharge but Don’t Overestimate: Calculating Damages for
Antitrust Injuries in Two-Sided Markets, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 808 (2011).
86
See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *6–7.
87
See Kristine Laudadio Devine, Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative
Markets, 10 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 59, 80–81 (2008).
88
See id.
89
See id.
90
See id.
82
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platforms increases and there are more available reviews.91 Similarly, the companies gain value as more end-users read product reviews because this leads to more purchases.92
2SPs can seek compensation from users on each side of the
market.93 In some cases, both users pay equally to benefit from the
platform. 94 For example, many dating sites charge equal membership rates for men and women, because both parties are, in theory,
benefitting equally from joining. 95
In other 2SPs, a firm requires that one side of the market fully
subsidizes the other in order to maximize profits, allowing the
second side to benefit from the service for free or better.96 R&R
companies are examples of these types of markets. The business
hiring the R&R provider pays for this technology while the enduser benefits at no cost.97 This unique characteristic might require
a different antitrust analysis because the R&R platform is only financially responsible to the businesses that purchase the R&R
technology.
II. CREATING SOCIETAL BENEFITS THROUGH MONOPOLY
This Note suggests that monopolies should be permitted in the
R&R industry. This theory is premised on the idea that monopolies
would create benefits for society in these contexts. Part II.A discusses why a monopoly would create more efficient results from
the industry by increasing the amount of product output through
91

Devine, supra note 87, at 79–80.
United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *6
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (noting that there is a thirty percent increase in sales for products
that have been reviewed, when compared to those that have not been rated, even when
those reviews are negative).
93
David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate
Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667, 675 (2005).
94
See id.
95
See, e.g., Cost Comparison: Internet Dating Sites, REAL SIMPLE, http://www.real
simple.com/work-life/money/cost-comparison-internet-dating-sites-00000000028239/
(last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
96
See Devine, supra note 87, at 59, 82; see also Evans & Noel, supra note 93, at 668.
97
See BAZAARVOICE: CONNECTIONS, http://www.bazaarvoice.com/solutions/
connections/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
92
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syndication. Part II.B discusses how monopolies can foster innovation, and Part II.C explains how monopolistic behavior in this field
can increase the accuracy of the ratings.
A. Network Effects and Syndication
The network effects of R&R platforms are stronger when businesses are using the same R&R provider.98 This is because of the
possibility of syndication.99
Syndication occurs where content on one site is made available
on another.100 Bazaarvoice technology allows reviews posted on
one company’s site to appear on the websites of other companies
that sell the reviewed product.101 For example, someone reading
reviews on Home Depot’s website can presumably see the review
posted on Lowes’ website. This benefits businesses that may publish a greater amount of R&R, and it benefits consumers who have
access to a greater amount of R&R. The existence of multiple competitors threatens this efficiency.102 Because a concentrated market
increases syndications, and syndication increases network effects,
it is possible that one firm’s monopoly in the industry may create
societal benefits strong enough to outweigh the anticompetitive
behavior.103
B. Innovations and Free Riding
Another reason for allowing monopolistic behavior in the R&R
industry could be the importance of innovation. Some theorize that
competition promotes innovation by forcing firms to maximize
98

See United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at
*8, *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014).
99
See id. at *20.
100
See Review Syndication, POWERREVIEWS, http://www.powerreviews.com/reviewsyndication/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2014) (“The PowerReviews Syndication Network
distributes your reviews to all major retailers and search engines.”).
101
See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *6.
102
The Bazaarvoice opinion presents this idea as one of the reasons that Bazaarvoice
wanted to acquire PowerReviews on the theory that PowerReviews was stealing
Bazaarvoice clients and thus taking away its competitive advantage of syndication.
However, syndication benefits society and can therefore be used as a reason why
anticompetitive behavior in this case may be acceptable. See id. at *11–13.
103
See id. at *51.
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profits.104 Others, however, propose that a dominating firm can foster innovation more so than firms in competition.105
Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of “creative destruction” asserts
that while a firm is dominating, it will be willing to invest in innovation,106 a risk that would dissuade competitive firms because of the
fear that others would piggyback off of new ideas.107 The theory
further purports that the domination is not dangerous because the
market leader will eventually be displaced.108 Others have supported this argument by advocating that antitrust rules should not
apply when innovation is at stake.109 This theory is based on the
premise that a firm wants to stop others from free riding off of its
investments. This is generally accepted in antitrust law as a procompetitive defense, and perhaps in this case poses a possible justification for encouraging a single firm to dominate.110
The major concern that a court might have with a procompetitive theory is that the effects are usually only justified when the
monopolistic behavior has continued for a period of time.111 For
example, if Bazaarvoice were trying to exclude PowerReviews from
a market of which PowerReviews was not originally a part, the free
riding justification might be accepted as procompetitive.112 However, because the R&R market operated competitively while Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews were acting individually, procompetitive
justifications are likely to have less merit.113
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C. Credit Rating Agencies and Why Ratings Become Less Accurate
The credit rating industry is another example of a 2SP, and it
shares many qualities with the R&R market.114 CRAs evaluate the
creditworthiness of firms (“issuers”) by assessing their ability to
pay back their debts in a timely manner.115 This evaluation is reported as a “credit rating” that is usually a letter- and numberbased estimate of risk.116 Investors rely on credit ratings before providing an issuer with capital.117 If a credit rating is high, as opposed
to low, investors are more likely to contribute to that issuer because
he is more likely to get a return on his investment.118
Because of this, issuers want high credit ratings so that investors are willing to supply them with capital.119 Investors, who rely
on an entity’s credit rating when deciding how to invest, want the
rating to be accurate in order to know where to invest.120 These desires might not be consistent.
Originally, the credit rating industry only hosted two main
agencies: Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.121 Around 1989, Fitch
started to become a major CRA as well, and the firms are currently
considered the “Big Three” agencies.122 Upon Fitch’s entry to the
market, the accuracy of ratings began to decline, and research suggests this is because CRAs are more accurate when there is less
competition.123
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Various studies have been conducted to explain why the presence of Fitch in the industry caused less accurate ratings.124 A recent study by Bo Becker of Harvard Business School and Todd
Milbourn of Washington University in St. Louis offered two possible explanations for the results, each of which has been supported
by other research.125 First, they theorize that issuers will “shop”
for the CRA that will rate it the highest.126 Second, they explore the
possibility that the incentive to maintain a good reputation is diminished when more competitors are present.127
The idea of “rating shopping” is that an issuer will seek out the
agency that will provide the highest credit rating.128 Because different agencies can interpret the same information differently,129 issuers can seek out the agency that will provide it with the best score.
It follows that the greater number of agencies competing, the more
shopping options issuers will have. To adequately compete in the
industry and offer a “better” product to their customers, the agencies will force each other to provide higher—and less accurate—
ratings.130 This incentive system may please issuers, but it is contrary to the desires of the investors who seek reliable information.131 Presumably, this issue is less likely to come about with less
competition because there are fewer shopping options, meaning
less pressure among competitors to inflate ratings.132
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Becker and Milbourn’s second hypothesis involves CRAs’ reputations.133 CRAs highly value their reputation.134 In fact, the former VP of Moody’s said, “What’s driving us is primarily the issue
of preserving our track record. That’s our bread and butter.”135
Similarly, an S&P representative claimed, “reputation is more important than revenues.”136
Over time, data can be collected on how accurately a particular
company can predict ratings, giving each agency a reputation.137
Those agencies with better reputations will be more trusted by investors, making them more useful.138 Thus, issuers who are trying
to attract investors will only retain CRAs with trustworthy reputations.
Becker and Milbourn’s research determined that reputational
concerns are a cause of less accurate ratings.139 They arrived at this
conclusion by finding that agencies care less about their reputations
when there are more competitors, and this undermines the quality
of ratings.140 Though they did not specify why this is the case, they
found the reputational incentives work best in modest competition.141
Research suggests that the unique features of the CRA industry
likely contribute to increases in competition, leading to less accurate ratings.142 The three features that the CRA industry possesses
that give rise to this phenomenon are that: (1) the field is controlled
by three main agencies; (2) the ratings are paid for solely by the
firms being rated and not those relying on the ratings; and (3) there
is a basic tension between what the firms whose securities are being
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rated want (high ratings) and what the consumers relying on the
ratings want (accurate ratings).143
This analysis is relevant in the R&R context given the similarities between the two industries. Like the CRA industry, the R&R
field is dominated by few firms,144 is compensated only by the companies whose products are being rated while the consumers access
the platform at no cost,145 and tension exists between these companies (who want high ratings) and the end-users (who want accurate
ratings).146 The similarities are suspicious enough to raise concerns
of competition in the industry.
A major distinction between the two industries is that R&R
platforms integrate their technology onto the already existing websites of their customers.147 If the businesses choose, they can display the name of the R&R provider on their product review web
page, but on other customers’ sites, the provider’s name never appears.148 Even where the R&R provider identifies itself, it is small
and nonobvious to end-users.149 Thus, it is unlikely consumers ei-
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ther notice or focus on which R&R company is providing its services.
Because end-users are not financially liable to R&R providers,
they lack influence in choosing a provider.150 Instead, consumers
must use whichever technology is provided to them, and they likely
cannot differentiate between R&R providers.151 Thus, businesses
are free to “shop” for the provider who will give them increased
ratings without affecting the trust of their end-users.152
The seemingly transparent nature of R&R platforms does not
ensure accuracy. Though a consumer may think he is receiving a
full array of accurate ratings because he can see which reviewers
posted and what each said, this can be misleading.153 R&R systems
like Yelp.com use specific algorithms to filter reviews.154 The alleged purpose of these algorithms is to hide what might be a “fake”
review, an untrustworthy review, or a review that the company
paid someone to write or wrote themselves.155 It can also eliminate
explicit and inappropriate reviews.156 However, some business
owners contend that Yelp.com chooses to filter out good reviews if
the establishment does not advertise with Yelp.157
Extensive research conducted by Michael Luca, a professor at
the Harvard Business School, finds that Yelp.com does not actually
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filter its reviews based on advertising.158 A public R&R platform
like Yelp.com has reputational concerns to consider when devising
its algorithm.159 The incentive to maintain a positive social image is
absent in outsourced companies like Bazaarvoice, incentivizing
businesses to ratings-shop.160
High ratings over the Internet are extremely important to businesses. Luca’s research revealed that a one-star increase in a
Yelp.com rating leads to a five to nine percent increase in revenues.161 Conversely, where companies’ ratings drop, their business
can suffer greatly.162 For example, a company called Beauty Doctor
NV, an electrolysis spa in Northern Virginia, used to have seventyfive customers on a typical day.163 However, when the company’s
Yelp.com review dropped to one star, it was left with few appointments daily.164 Further, discount companies like Living Social and
Groupon, would no longer collaborate with Beauty Doctor.165
Businesses are incentivized to ratings-shop because of the financial benefits of a high rating and the financial harms of a negative one.166 In a competitive environment, R&R platforms are incentivized to inflate ratings to satisfy their customers, because
there are limited reputational or other restraints on R&R platforms
encouraging them to provide accurate information.167 Whether or
not R&R platforms are currently or purposefully providing inaccurate information to consumers, they have the technology and ability
to do so, which would make competition within the industry harmful to the trusting consumers who rely upon the industry for much
of their purchasing decisions.
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AVOIDING DECEPTION

The conflict illustrated in the above section is not to say that
the merger between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews should have
been allowed, or that monopolies make for a better economy. Rather, it is intended to highlight some benefits that may justify anticompetitive behavior in the R&R industry. However, when these
justifications are denied, our legal system must at least find a way
to counteract the possibility of inaccurate ratings to protect consumers.
Our legal system has developed many protections to ensure
that consumers are not deceived.168 We have laws against false advertising to help close the information gap between buyers and sellers.169 We have laws regulating endorsements to ensure buyers
know that a celebrity who is promoting a product is only doing so in
exchange for money.170 Likewise, we need regulations in the R&R
industry so that consumers are not tricked by seemingly accurate
review systems.
The R&R industry might best be suited by government regulation. This section presents two possible ways that the industry
could be regulated to protect both direct and indirect consumers:
(1) the government can mandate product certification for R&R
platforms to ensure that consumers are getting accurate information; and/or (2) the government can increase transparency by requiring platforms to reveal their identity as the provider of an R&R
service, and how, if at all, the ratings and reviews are filtered.
A. Product Certification
Product certification is a way to expose certain attributes of a
product, to decrease the cost of information gathering for consum-
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ers, and to make the product more transparent.171 Most often product certification is used when consumers cannot identify the important traits of a product even after the purchase is made.172 For example, the organic food industry must be certified because most
consumers will not know whether the food is organic even after
consumption.173 The R&R industry epitomizes this concept.
If an R&R provider were using an algorithm that skews the accuracy of ratings, an end-user reading the ratings would never
know of the deception. Imagine an end-user who purchased a
product believing it to have a high star-count, and the consumer
ended up disliking the product. That consumer will not likely think
the R&R provider deceived him; rather, he will probably believe
that his taste differs from that of the other consumers. He might be
unhappy with the purchase, yet he will not be aware of the trickery
used to make the sale and might continue to rely on that information provider in the future.
Such trickery is not condoned in our society nor well tolerated
in our legal system. Certifying R&R products can help solve this
potential harm. The FTC (the same body that regulates commercial advertising) could certify R&R algorithms used to filter and
display reviews to ensure that providers are conveying accurate reviews. This option could be impractical if the algorithms are trade
secrets of the company. However, it is possible that the algorithms
are not trade secrets or that the FTC could somehow guarantee
each algorithm’s secrecy.
B. Transparency and Consumer Awareness
The current R&R industry could be changed in two ways to
make the systems more transparent to consumers. The first is that
users of these systems should be made aware that an algorithm fil-
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ters some ratings.174 Second, consumers should know which R&R
providers are integrated into which websites.
Some consumers are probably unaware that R&R systems filter
certain reviews and that these reviews are not factored into the average star rating.175 This is especially problematic when a system
makes errors in filtering reviews or filters them for the wrong reasons. Usually, this process is intended to eliminate fake reviews
created by the company itself, or vulgar reviews.176 However, if
consumers would like to read the filtered reviews, they should be
readily available.
If platforms are using filtration systems, they should be required to disclose that some reviews are filtered and clearly explain
how the reviews are filtered. These disclaimers should be in a visible location on each review page. Further, the filtered reviews
should be accessible to consumers, even if in another location. For
example, Yelp.com provides a hyperlink to its filtered reviews for
users who scroll to the bottom of each page.177 Though this does
not necessarily make the site more transparent because a user must
scroll through many reviews before even finding this link, it is an
example of how consumers may be able to view filtered reviews.
Also, consumers should be explicitly notified whether or not filtered ratings factor into a product’s star-count, to avoid any possible confusion.
Further, some consumers are probably unaware that companies
outsource to commercial providers of R&R.178 This can be problematic in attributing blames or successes of the software to the
commercial R&R providers.179 In order to help ameliorate this
problem, R&R providers should be required to display their trademark somewhere on each review page.
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As discussed earlier, the credit rating industry has a strong incentive not to exaggerate ratings because the agencies need to
maintain a strong reputation.180 If R&R providers are required to
put their trademark in a visible location on each review page, consumers will come to identify providers and either trust or distrust
certain platforms. This will presumably improve accuracy of review
algorithms, as R&R providers will have to protect their reputations.
Admittedly, this might not improve competition among the rating agencies. However, it should provide protection to consumers
by ensuring that the ratings and reviews that they read are more
accurate or improving their understanding of what they are reading. Both of these measures will make the platform more accountable to the consumer, balancing the two sides of the market.181 This
accountability will likely create more accurate ratings by putting a
reputational burden on the provider, and will give the consumer
more information regarding the technology of the system.
CONCLUSION
The R&R industry might better serve society if it operates as a
monopoly. This is because it would have the potential to create efficiencies, foster innovation, and provide more accurate ratings.
This Note argues that the ability of R&R providers to manipulate ratings, the incentives they have to do so, and the fact that they
can do so without consumers’ knowledge requires some form of
regulation of the industry. Without such regulation, traditional antitrust principles are inapplicable to the R&R industry, and the Bazaarvoice judgment may be victim to this, and other, fallacies.
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